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SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND THE 
PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION: THE SANTIAGO 
PRINCIPLES AND INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
n 2008 and 2009, Sovereign Wealth Funds (“SWF”) appeared al-
most daily in financial news and had risen in significance in interna-
tional capital markets and policy circles. Having grown in number and 
size, SWFs are now the second largest class of investors in the interna-
tional capital market.1 In general terms, SWFs are private equity funds 
run by governments to manage their excess foreign reserves. They are 
among a range of investment vehicles that governments can employ to 
manage excess revenues or foreign reserves.2 One of the key differences 
between SWFs and other investment vehicles is that SWFs typically have 
higher risk preferences and return expectations.3 
SWFs, however, are not a new phenomenon in the international capital 
market. One of the oldest SWFs dates back to 1953, when Kuwait estab-
lished the Kuwait Investment Authority (“KIA”),4 and, as Dr. Lyons5 
                                                                                                             
 1. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate 
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 
1356 (2008). SWFs lag only behind large institutional asset managers such as Fidelity 
and Barclays. François Bujon de l’Estang, Chairman, Citi France, presentation at Tables 
rondes finance islamique et fonds souverains des 14 et 15 mai 2008: Sovereign Wealth 
Funds: Growing Global Force 3 (May 15, 2008), available at http://www.senat.fr/commission/ 
fin/actualites/fs_bujon.ppt. 
 2. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1354 (“Sovereign wealth funds belong to a 
continuum of sovereign investment vehicles. At one end of the spectrum are central 
banks. At the other end are state-owned enterprises such as Russia’s Gazprom or China’s 
National Offshore Oil Corp. In between are sovereign stabilization funds, sovereign sav-
ing funds, and government investment corporations. Thus one way to define sovereign 
wealth funds is by exclusion: SWFs are sovereign investment vehicles that are not central 
banks, monetary authorities in charge of foreign reserves, or national pension funds, un-
less they are financed by commodities exports.”); Edward F. Greene & Brian A. Yeager, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Measured Assessment, 3 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 247, 249 
(2008). See also Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Growing 
Global Force 11 (2008). 
 3. Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth 
Funds and the World Economy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan/Feb 2008, at 119 
 4. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 120. See also GERARD LYONS, STANDARD CHARTERED 
BANK, STATE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 5, 22 (2007); Testi-
mony Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, U.S. H.R.: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds: Impacts on US Foreign Policy and Economic Interests, at 8 (May 21, 2008) (tes-
I 
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noted, “Of the twenty two largest SWFs . . . seven were in existence be-
fore 1990, six started in the 90s and nine since the millennium.”6 
Despite the number of years SWFs have existed, their sheer number 
and size have recently raised a number of concerns.7 Among these are 
that “SWFs are a threat to the sovereignty of the nations in whose corpo-
ration they invest” and that “the nations whose corporations are targets of 
investments are said to be threatened with becoming ‘sharecropper’ 
states if ownership of industry moves to foreign-government absentee 
holders.”8 The biggest concern, however, is that SWFs will make deci-
sions for political or strategic reasons rather than economic and commer-
cial ones.9 In fact, the increasing number of SWFs and the ownership 
stakes they are taking have led to an outcry for regulatory control and for 
opposition to SWF investment in recipient countries.10 
In this Note, I will discuss the various concerns surrounding SWFs, the 
need for international regulation, and possible solutions to some of the 
problems SWFs raise. The focus of this discussion is on the problem of 
asymmetric information. Asymmetric information occurs when one party 
has better information than the counterparty.11 SWFs are not in the same 
position as typical private parties in business relationships, which might 
have superior information. First, unlike private parties, SWFs might have 
interests that are not economic or commercial in nature.12 Second, SWFs 
                                                                                                             
timony of Edwin M. Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson Inst.), available at http://www. 
petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/truman0508.pdf [hereinafter Truman Testimony]. 
 5. Dr. Gerard Lyons is Chief Economist and Group Head of Global Research at 
Standard Chartered. Lyons, Chief Economist and Group Head of Global Research, Stan-
dard Chartered, Speech at the Institute for International Bankers Annual Washington 
Conference: Two Hot Topics: Sovereign Wealth Funds and China 3 (Mar. 3, 2008), 
available at http://wholesalebanking.standardchartered.com/en/capabilities/financialmarkets/ 
research/Documents/thoughtleadershpspeeches.pdf. 
 6. Id. at 5. 
 7. Id. at 3. 
 8. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1345–46. 
 9. Id. at 1346. 
 10. See Katrin Bennhold, Sovereign Wealth Funds Seek Balance Against Western 
Regulation, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/23/ 
business/fund.php; US Treasury Cautions China over Sovereign Wealth Fund, CHANNEL 
NEWSASIA, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/ 
view/327561/1/.html; Cathy Mputhia, Sovereign Funds Rub Governments the Wrong 
Way, BUS. DAILY (Africa), Sept. 10, 2008, http://www.bdafrica.com/index.php?option= 
com_content&task=view&id=9923&Itemid=5848. 
 11. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., Advance Information for Award 
of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1–2 (Oct. 
10, 2001), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/ecoadv.pdf. 
 12. Lyons, supra note 5, at 5. 
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introduce state capitalism to the market.13 The problem of asymmetric 
information is the source of the problems surrounding SWFs and that any 
regulation of SWFs must address this issue. 
Part I will provide a background discussion on SWFs. Particularly, I 
will focus on their significance to the global capital market, the current 
global market’s effect on SWFs, and how the United States currently 
regulates SWF investments. Part II discusses the need for regulations, 
while Part III addresses why SWFs must be regulated internationally. 
Part IV discusses the newly adopted Santiago Principles created by the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) to govern SWF conducts. 
I. BACKGROUND ON SWFS 
A. What Are SWFs? 
As the Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs in the U.S. 
Treasury Department, Clay Lowery, noted in his remarks concerning 
SWFs, “There is no universal, agreed definition [of SWFs].”14 However, 
because SWFs are only one of several ways a government can manage 
and invest in the global capital market,15 “[d]ifferentiation between dif-
ferent types of sovereign-controlled entities is integral to identifying pol-
icy issues raised by their activities, and in crafting appropriate policies to 
address such issues.”16 
The definitions offered by the U.S. Treasury Department (“Treasury 
Department”) and the IMF are helpful for discussion purposes. The Trea-
sury Department defines an SWF as “a government investment vehicle 
which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages those 
assets separately from official reserves.”17 The IMF adopted a similar 
definition: a “government-owned investment [fund], set up for a variety 
of macroeconomic purposes. They are commonly funded by the transfer 
of foreign exchange assets that are invested long term, overseas.”18 
                                                                                                             
 13. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1346. 
 14. Clay Lowery, Acting Under Sec’y for Int’l Affairs, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Remarks 
on Sovereign Wealth Funds and the International Financial System (June 21, 2007), 
http://www.treas.gov/press/release/hp471.htm. 
 15. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 120. See also Lyons, supra note 5, at 5. 
 16. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 249. Even within the realm of SWFs, there are 
different ways to organize and structure an SWF. See INT’L WORKING GROUP OF 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, INT’L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: 
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 11 (2008). 
 17. Lowery, supra note 14. 
 18. INT’L MONETARY FUND, MONETARY AND CAPITAL MARKETS AND POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW DEPARTMENTS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS—A WORK 
AGENDA 4 (Mark Allen & Jaime Caruana eds., 2008). 
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Dr. Lyons offers a slightly more specific and detailed definition. He 
limits it to four features: (i) the organization is owned by a sovereign na-
tion state, but, as an exception, includes five subnational-level funds 
“that are financed by foreign exchange assets resulting from commodi-
ties exports, and that are large enough to rank within [the] top [twenty-
two SWFs]”;19 (ii) the organization is “[n]ot a national pension fund, un-
less [it is] financed directly by foreign exchange assets generated by 
commodity exports”; (iii) the organization is “not [a] central bank[] or 
[authority] that perform[s] roles typical of a central bank”; and (iv) the 
organization is a “investment fund[] rather than producer[] of goods or 
services.”20 
Finally, in the recently published Santiago Principles, the IMF’s Inter-
national Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds defined SWFs as 
“special-purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the 
general government.”21 The term “general government” includes “both 
central government and subnational government.”22 The definition ex-
cludes, “inter alia, foreign currency reserve assets held by monetary au-
thorities for the traditional balance of payments or monetary policy  
purposes, state-owned enterprises . . . in the traditional sense, govern-
ment-employee pension funds, or assets managed for the benefit of indi-
viduals.”23 
While these definitions are useful in defining the limits of SWF, it is 
important to recognize that they are both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive.24 However, this Note will be using the International Working 
Group’s definition for SWFs because it is sufficiently broad to include 
most of the entities affected by the Santiago Principles. 
B. Who Has SWFs? 
As of 2009, there are over twenty-two entities widely accepted as 
SWFs.25 The seven largest are known as the “Super Seven,” and each has 
                                                                                                             
 19. The five subnational-level funds large enough to be ranked with the top twenty-
two SWFs are ADIA (Abu Dhabi), Istihmar (Dubai), Dubai International Capital, Alberta 
Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Canada), and Alaska’s Permanent Reserve Fund. Lyons, 
supra note 5, at 23–24. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See INT’L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, supra note 16, at 3. 
 22. See id. at 3 n.5. 
 23. See id. at 3 n.6. 
 24. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 23. For example, the IMF definition does not explicit-
ly exclude noncommodity-based national pension funds. The Treasury definition does not 
include central banks that perform management functions for foreign investments such as 
the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority. 
 25. Id. at 23. 
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over $100 billion in assets.26 The Super Seven includes Abu Dhabi In-
vestment Authority, the Government of Singapore Investment Corpora-
tion, the Government Pension Fund of Norway, KIA, China Investment 
Corporation, Russia National Wealth Fund, and Temasek Holdings.27 Of 
the listed owners, United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi Investment Authori-
ty possesses the largest SWF, with assets estimated to be somewhere be-
tween $250 billion and $1 trillion.28 Another player of note in this league 
of large SWFs is the China Investment Corporation (“CIC”), which has 
an initial endowment of $200 billion.29 While not as large as the Super 
Seven, the holdings of other SWFs are still quite substantial.30 
C. Why Create SWFs? 
The goals of SWFs, unsurprisingly, depend on to whom they belong 
and the source of their endowments.31 Apart from potential political and 
strategic motivations, SWFs are typically created in order to achieve any 
combination of the following goals: macroeconomic stabilization, inter-
generation transfers, higher returns, and domestic industrial develop-
ments.32 
Countries that establish SWFs for macroeconomic stabilization pur-
poses are usually “highly dependent on commodity exports” because 
they are “exposed to swings in global prices.”33 For countries like Rus-
sia,34 the macroeconomic stabilization component functions (i) by sup-
plementing government revenues when there is a decrease in global pric-
                                                                                                             
 26. Id. at 7. 
 27. Id. See generally Truman Testimony, supra note 4, at 8 (providing a more com-
plete list of SWFs). 
 28. Bujon de l’Estang, supra note 1, at 4; Lyons, supra note 5, at 32. Standard Char-
ter estimates Abu Dhabi’s assets to be approximately $600 billion, but Citigroup esti-
mates the assets to be closer to $875 billion. Bujon de l’Estang, supra note 1, at 4; Lyons, 
supra note 5, at 32. The results of the estimates vary significantly due to the lack of 
transparency of Abu Dhabi’s fund. 
 29. Bujon de l’Estang, supra note 1, at 9; Lyons, supra note 5, at 36. 
 30. See generally Lyons, supra note 5, at 32–62 (providing a list and features of the 
twenty-two largest SWFs). 
 31. See id. at 29. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Russia is exposed to global swings in commodity prices because its exports are 
concentrated in a few commodities (i.e., oil, natural gas, metals, and timber). These ex-
ports account for over eighty percent of Russia’s exports and thirty percent of govern-
ment revenues. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACT BOOK (2008). See also 
Lyons, supra note 5, at 37. Countries that also depend on a few commodities good for 
their economies are similarly situated, since their economies are not sufficiently diversi-
fied. 
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es, and (ii) by absorbing excess revenues when there is an increase in 
global prices, thereby preventing inflation.35 An SWF with macroeco-
nomic stabilizing goals can helps minimize “short- and medium-term 
fluctuations.”36 Similarly, countries dependent on finite commodity re-
sources (e.g., oil and coal) may create SWFs to preserve the wealth of 
these national resources for future generations by converting them into 
financial resources.37 This wealth could be used to finance pension funds, 
such as Norway’s Government Pension Fund,38 or be used as an “alterna-
tive to oil reserves for . . . future generations,” such as Kuwait’s KIA.39 
Higher returns are also a common objective of SWFs.40 Traditionally, 
foreign reserves are kept and maintained by the country’s central bank.41 
Due to the goals42 and roles that central banks serve, their assets tend to 
be held in lower risk and lower-yielding financial vehicles.43 With the 
build up of reserves,44 these countries are motivated by the “opportunity 
cost associated with funds being invested in risk free assets” to seek 
                                                                                                             
 35. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 120; Y.V. Reddy, Governor, Reserve Bank of India, 
Address at the Golden Jubilee Celebrations of the Foreign Exchange Dealers’ Associa-
tion of India, Mumbai: Forex Reserves, Stabilization Funds, and Sovereign Wealth 
Funds: Indian Perspective 3 (Oct. 8, 2007). 
 36. Lyons, supra note 5, at 29. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 33. 
 39. Id. at 35. 
 40. Id. at 29. 
 41. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 120. 
 42. The IMF lists six major objectives for central banks: 
support and maintain confidence in the policies for monetary and exchange rate 
management . . . ; limit external vulnerability by maintaining foreign currency 
liquidity to absorb shocks during times of crisis or when access to borrowing is 
curtailed . . . ; provide a level of confidence to markets that a country can meet 
its external obligations; demonstrate the backing of domestic currency by ex-
ternal assets; assist the government in meeting its foreign exchange needs and 
external debt obligations; and maintain a reserve for national disasters or emer-
gencies. 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE MANAGEMENT 
(2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/ferm/eng/index.htm#I. 
 43. See John Nugée, Foreign Exchange Reserves Management, in CTR. FOR CENT. 
BANKING STUDIES BANK OF ENG. 26–29 (Handbooks in Central Banking No. 19, 2000). 
 44. By 2006, Asian central banks, at $3.1 trillion, held over sixty percent of the global 
foreign reserves. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE NEW POWER BROKERS: HOW OIL, 
ASIA, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY ARE SHAPING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 73 
(2007), http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/The_New_Power_Brokers/. 
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higher returns for their money.45 Finally, some countries utilize SWFs to 
“restructure and encourage domestic industries.”46 
D. Why Are SWFs Significant? 
SWFs are significant for a variety of reasons. Primary among these are 
the size of their asset holdings and their investment strategies. Already 
holding an estimated $2–3 trillion in assets,47 SWFs are projected by var-
ious commentators to grow rapidly during the next decade and reach an 
estimated value of somewhere between $7 trillion and $13.4 trillion in 
assets.48 However, even when we use the upper estimated aggregate size 
of SWFs, $3 trillion, the amount of assets held by SWFs is small when 
compared to the amount of global financial assets or U.S. denominated 
assets in existence. As a point of reference, in 2006, global financial as-
sets were estimated to be about $164 trillion, and U.S. denominated as-
sets about $56.1 trillion. 49 This means that SWFs are only 1.8% and 6%, 
respectively, of these markets. Nonetheless, even though SWFs hold a 
small share of the global capital markets, they should not be ignored. At 
$3 trillion, they have more assets than both hedge funds50 and private 
equities51 combined.52 Even individually, the six largest SWFs are com-
parable to the largest institutional investors in the world.53 Regardless of 
what metric of reference we use to assess the size of their holdings, 
SWFs are large enough to affect market prices.54 
Besides their size, another important concern is their investment strate-
gy. As noted above, traditionally, countries manage their foreign reserves 
                                                                                                             
 45. Lyons, supra note 5, at 29. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 44 FIN. & DEV. (Sept. 
2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight.htm. 
 48. See STEPHEN JEN, MORGAN STANLEY, HOW BIG COULD SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS BE BY 2015? at 2 (2007) (projecting SWF assets to reach $12 tirllion by 2015); 
John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Dir. of the Int’l Monetary Fund, Speech at the Seminar: 
Sovereign Funds: Responsibility with Our Future 2 (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www. 
imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/090308.htm (projecting SWF assets to reach $7-13 
trillion by 2013); Lyons, supra note 5, at 9 (projecting SWF assets to reach $13.4 trillion 
over the next decade). 
 49. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MAPPING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS FOURTH ANNUAL 
REPORT 10–11 (2008), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/mapping_ 
global/. 
 50. Hedge funds are estimated to have approximately $1–1.5 trillion in assets. Lyons, 
supra note 5, at 11. 
 51. Private equities are estimated to have $0.7–1.1 trillion in assets. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Bujon de l’Estang, supra note 1, at 3. 
 54. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122. 
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with their central banks or financial ministries that perform central bank 
functions.55 Central banks and their equivalents have typically focused 
their investment in low-risk and low-yield assets (e.g., U.S. treasury 
bonds) to preserve liquidity.56 With the significant accumulation of for-
eign reserves, preservation of liquidity becomes less important and coun-
tries shift their asset allocation to include more higher-risk and higher-
yield assets (e.g., equity, real estates, and hedge funds).57 
While SWFs do raise policy concerns, they can also be very beneficial 
to the global capital market if managed properly. SWFs are “in principle 
long-term investors, which typically do not deviate from their strategic 
asset allocations in the face of short-term volatility.”58 By shifting away 
from debt assets, SWFs are actually promoting a more stable financial 
market by reducing the effects of entry and withdrawal that would oth-
erwise occur in the debt market.59 They also allow the reserve-rich coun-
tries to “recycle trade surpluses and to increase the supply of funds to the 
equity market,” thereby “reducing the cost of capital.”60 SWFs are par-
ticularly attractive for this function because they are not highly leveraged 
and can provide liquidity to the capital market.61 
E. How Does the United States Regulate SWF Investments? 
In the United States, since 1988, foreign directed investments (“FDIs”) 
were subject to the Exon-Florio Amendment. 62 After the controversial 
attempt by China National Offshore Oil Company and Dubai Ports 
World to acquire Unocal, and Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company, respectively, Congress passed the Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”) to amend the Exon-Florio 
Amendment.63 FINSA confers on the president the power to “suspend or 
prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the national se-
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. at 120. 
 56. See Nugée, supra note 43, at 26–29. 
 57. See id. Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs Clay Lowery explains 
that “force diversification” is occurring because the amount of assets held by SWFs have 
outgrown the amount of debt assets in the world. Lowery, supra note 14. 
 58. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122. 
 59. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1360. 
 60. Id. at 1360. 
 61. Id. at 1360; Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122. 
 62. “Exon-Florio amend[ed] Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950.” W. 
Robert Shearer, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation Susceptible to 
Abuse, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1731 n.12 (1993). See also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988) 
(amended 2007); Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1349; Greene & Yeager, supra note 
2, at 261. 
 63. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1349; Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 261. 
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curity of the United States.”64 Further, the statute makes the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) responsible for 
(i) review[ing] acquisitions by foreign persons of control of US busi-
nesses in the interest of US national security during a [thirty] day pe-
riod after notice or its own initiation of the review, (ii) [investigating] 
such acquisitions during an additional [forty-five] day period if the 
transaction threatens the national security of the US, is by a foreign 
government controlled entity, would result in critical infrastructure 
coming under control of a foreign person or the government agency 
leading the review so recommends and (iii) report[ing] its findings to 
Congress.65 
Since its inception in 1975, by March 2006, CFIUS had reviewed over 
1600 cases of foreign acquisitions.66 In 2006, “of approximately 10,000 
[mergers and acquisitions] transactions [in the United States], 1,730 were 
cross-border.”67 During that year, 113 of the cross-border transactions 
were subject to CFIUS review but none were blocked.68 Despite the 
number of cases it reviewed, however, the Committee has investigated 
only twenty-five and submitted twelve of them to the president for deci-
sion.69 Of the twelve cases, the president elected to allow eleven of the 
transactions to proceed.70 The only occurrence of a presidential divest-
ment of FDI occurred in 1990 when President George H.W. Bush or-
dered China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation 
to divest its interest in MAMCO, an aircraft parts company.71 
                                                                                                             
 64. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (2007). 
 65. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 261 (citation omitted). See also 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170 (2007). 
 66. Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Mar. 2, 
2006) (testimony by Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury), availa-
ble at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js4086.htm [hereinafter Kimmitt Testimony]. 
 67. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 262; Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 123. 
 68. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 262; Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 123. 
 69. Kimmitt Testimony, supra note 66. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. (indicating that since 1988, the president only ordered one forced 
divestiture out of the twelve cases submitted for decision after investigation); 
Message from George H.W. Bush, President of the U.S., to U.S. Congress on the China 
National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Man-
ufacturing, Incorporated (Feb. 1, 1990), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=18109); ANN M. CALVARESI-BARR, DIR., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, DEFENSE TRADE: ENHANCEMENTS TO 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE LAW’S EFFECTIVENESS, 
GAO Doc. No. 05-686, at 10 (2005); KATHERINE V. SCHINASI, ASSOC. DIR., U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATE, DEFENSE TRADE: 
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As Edward Greene and Brian Yeager72 noted, “despite the small num-
ber of final negative determinations by CFIUS, CFIUS review can have 
an in terrorem effect that discourages transactions.”73 In addition to 
FINSA, SWFs are also subject to various traditional regulations such as 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.74 
II. CONCERNS INVOLVING SWFS 
The growing importance of SWFs raises various policy issues and 
concerns for host countries, recipient countries, and the international cap-
ital market in general. Of these concerns, lack of transparency, economic 
protectionism, market distortions, conflicts of interest, strategic position-
ing, and national security are at the forefront of the debate. Each of these 
issues must be addressed carefully in order to ensure that SWFs are not 
unduly restricted when providing necessary protection to all parties. 
A. Lack of Transparency 
One of recipient countries’ largest complaints is the lack of transparen-
cy of some SWFs.75 While some hedge funds and private equity funds 
are equally, if not more, secretive about their investments, recipient 
countries have found the opaqueness of SWFs much more alarming.76 As 
one commentator suggests, this is not because SWFs are nontransparent 
about their investments, but because they are government owned.77 Also, 
                                                                                                             
IDENTIFYING FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY CAN BE IMPROVED, 
GAO/NSIAD Doc. No. 00-144, at 9 (2000). 
 72. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 247 n*. 
 73. Id. at 262; Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 123. The authors give the example of a CIC 
official’s statement that “[CIC] will not consider investments in the USA that may be 
subject to CFIUS review,” after the failure of Bain Capital and Huawei Technologies’s 
bid to acquire 3Com. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 262. 
 74. Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 264–66. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–50; 
15 U.S.C. § 18a; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll. 
 75. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1360; Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 268; 
Lowery, supra note 14; Lyons, supra note 5, at 12–14. 
 76. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 6. As Deputy Secretary Kimmitt stated, the frame-
work for market discipline applicable to hedge funds to mitigate systematic risk is not 
applicable to SWFs. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 128. This is because “SWFs are public-
sector entities managing public funds, and profit maximization may not be considered the 
primary objective.” Id. Unlike hedge funds, the key avenues for transparency between the 
fund and counterparties, and among counterparties, creditors, and regulators are not ap-
plicable, and counterparties may rely on sovereign guarantees to ensure payment rather 
than practice market discipline. Id. 
 77. Lyons, supra note 7. 
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the opaqueness of SWFs has the potential of affecting private investors 
due to uncertainties involving the funds’ behavior.78 
In regards to transparency concerns, one commentator has noted that 
SWFs have never conducted themselves in any way to warrant the suspi-
cion placed on them.79 The lack of evidence of wrongful conduct, how-
ever, is largely irrelevant. This commentator failed to recognize that what 
is perceived to be true can be far more important than what is actually 
true. If an SWF is perceived to be acting with ulterior motives, a country 
will most likely take action against the perceived threat. The mere fact 
that the perception is wrong or that there is no evidence to support that 
perception will therefore not make much of a difference. While some 
might argue that States should not act in such a manner, this is the only 
rational decision. In terms of game theory, countries are in a non-
cooperative game environment and have an asymmetry of information 
problem.80 While countries often do cooperate with each other, they are 
still in such an environment because there is no way to form binding and 
enforceable agreements.81 It is important to remember that countries 
cooperate with each other voluntarily and there is no meaningful way to 
force compliance short of going to war.82 
                                                                                                             
 78. Lowery, supra note 14. See also Truman, supra note 4, at 3. 
 79. Bader M. Al Sa’ad, Kuwait Inv. Auth., Key Note Speech at the First Luxembourg 
Foreign Trade Conference: Overview on the Kuwait Investment Authority and Issues 
Related to Sovereign Wealth Funds 6 (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://www.kia.gov.kw/ 
NR/rdonlyres/67D2B0DD-450D-4B51-B522-C2BE1C00F12D/916/FINA_SPCH_LUXE 
MBORG_APR_9_092.pdf. 
 80. See generally 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 133–35 (John 
Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 661–63 
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). In a non-cooperative game setting, there exists no institu-
tion that can make binding any agreement among players. 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE A 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra, at 661. Asymmetric information occurs when players 
of a particular game are not privy to the same information. 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE A 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra, at 133. 
 81. It could be argued that countries will comply with international agreements and 
treaties because noncompliance would be too costly and even as “soft law,” these rules 
can still have practical effects. Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community 
Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, in IMPLEMENTING EC LAW IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM: STRUCTURES FOR INDIRECT RULE 64 (Terence Daintith ed., 1995). 
However, because compliance of international law in general is voluntary, there is always 
a risk that a country will decide that the benefit of noncompliance outweighs the cost of 
compliance. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 705, 705 (1988). In such a non-cooperative environment, one cannot assume that the 
mere fact that a party is complying with international agreements or treaties now means 
there will be compliance in the future. 
 82. See Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are 
Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1285 n.264 (2005) (citing Patricia McGowan 
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Countries are also plagued with the problem of asymmetry of informa-
tion. There is simply no way for a country to predict how counterparties 
will behave, and there is always a risk that they will guess wrong. There-
fore, countries can only act on the information that they perceive to be 
true, and depending on the urgency of the situation, there may not be an 
opportunity to ascertain the accuracy of the information before taking 
adverse action. 
Furthermore, even though some SWFs have existed for a long time, 
their opaqueness also creates concerns about their potential impact on 
market stability.83 Markets and investors do not have extensive expe-
rience dealing with SWFs or similar entities because countries tended to 
prefer debt assets in the past and held little, if any, equity assets.84 There-
fore, because SWF investment policies are poorly understood, markets 
will experience greater volatility when they have, or are suspected to 
have, SWF participation.85 With no information or experience to guide 
them, market participants have no way to distinguish mere rumors from 
actual facts, or minor comments from significant ones.86 This increases 
the level of uncertainty and risk associated with participating in the mar-
ket. Elevated risk levels will increase the cost of capital because a higher 
risk premium will be needed to compensate parties for the amplified risk. 
With that said, however, it is important to bear in mind that mere for-
mal disclosure would not resolve any of the transparency concerns.87 
Disclosures are only as meaningful as the creditability of the disclosing 
party. A party’s denials and disclosures have little creditability when the 
party is already suspected or accused of misconduct. Similarly, if a host 
government lacks creditability, any statements made or disclosures pub-
lished are unlikely to be taken at face value. This illustrates that the real 
concern regarding transparency is the problem of asymmetric informa-
tion and underscores the need for a credible method to ascertain the truth. 
This problem places SWFs that lack creditability but are innocent of any 
misconduct at risk of unwarranted adverse actions. Any regulation of 
SWFs must address these transparency and creditability concerns. 
                                                                                                             
Wald, Judging at the Hague, JUD. DIVISION REC., Summer 2002, at 19–20) (noting that 
international law has been enforced “only by voluntary compliance, diplomacy, threats of 
war or war itself”). 
 83. Lowery, supra note 14. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 1362 (discussing the problem of voluntary 
disclosures). 
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B. Economic Nationalism and Protectionism 
Another concern raised by the increased globalization of the financial 
market is the growing sentiments of economic nationalism and protec-
tionism that FDIs have sparked. Despite the benefits that globalization 
can bring, this is a sensitive issue that is not just limited to industrialized 
countries, but is also prevalent in emerging market economies.88 China’s 
and Dubai’s attempted acquisition of major U.S. assets caused such a 
political outcry in the United States that the parties withdrew their bid for 
acquisition.89 Similarly, Germany recently proposed new legislation to 
allow the Economy Minister to scrutinize purchases of stakes of twenty-
five percent or more in German firms by buyers from outside the Euro-
pean Union and its four partners in the European Free Trade Association 
and, if necessary, to block the transaction.90 Even African countries, 
which were initially enthusiastic about Chinese investments, are expe-
riencing backlash due to concerns over “China’s intentions and . . . 
whether its investment was in the Continent’s best interests.”91 
The real fear for the recipient countries is that if they sell off more and 
more of their economy and country each year, they will be subjugating 
themselves to a “sharecropper economy.”92 While this would be undesir-
able, economic protectionism or nationalism is not the answer. Globali-
zation of the financial capital market has many benefits.93 For example, 
businesses are no longer tied to their own domestic capital market and 
can obtain capital at a lower cost94 by tapping into international capital.95 
                                                                                                             
 88. Lowery, supra note 14. 
 89. Lyons, supra note 5, at 16–17. 
 90. Jonathan Braude, New German Foreign Investment Law Faces Challenges, 
LAW.COM, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202424321685. 
 91. Lyons, supra note 5, at 16. 
 92. David R. Francis, Will Sovereign Wealth Funds Rule the World?: These Enorm-
ous Government-owned Funds May Turn Their Economic Clout into Political Gain, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2007, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/ 
1126/p16s01-wmgn.html. 
 93. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 124–26. 
 94. To illustrate the benefits of and differences between a purely domestic (“closed”) 
capital market and an international (“open”) capital market, we can look at the cost of 
capital. N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 53, 115 (4th ed. 2003). The cost of 
capital is really the cost of borrowing or the interest rate. Id. at 54–55. The interest rate is 
determined by the supply of capital and the demand for capital, and is inexplicably tied to 
a country’s economic output. Id. at 59–61. One measure of the output of a country’s 
economy is the gross domestic product (“GDP”). Id. at 15–16. Under the expenditure 
method of measuring GDP in a closed economy, GDP = Consumption (C) + Investment 
(I) + Government Spending (G). Id. at 53. A simple reorganization of this equation shows 
that I = GDP – C – G – net exports (NE); in other words, investment is always equal to 
the national savings in a purely domestic market. Id. at 59–61. As we can see, the nation-
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It also helps countries finance current account deficits.96 Among these 
benefits is the increased ability of investors to spread risk by diversifica-
tion into different markets, contributing to the stability of the global fi-
nancial market.97 The biggest threat to maximizing the benefits of a 
global capital market, as Deputy Secretary Kimmitt noted, is “investment 
protectionism,” the erection of barriers to foreign investment.98 To re-
duce the risk that countries will engage in protectionist conduct, regula-
tions need to encourage SWFs to behave in a purely commercial manner. 
C. Market Distortions 
SWFs have the potential of creating market distortion because of their 
size and their governmental connections.99 SWFs are “already large 
enough to be systemically significant,” and if they are imprudently ma-
naged and misguidedly take risk, there will be broad consequences for 
the whole market.100 For example, there is a danger that SWFs might not 
perceive risk correctly. Unlike traditional financial institutions, SWFs are 
accountable only to their respective governments because they are their 
only principal. This feature is a benefit for the financial market because 
capital requirements or investor withdrawals cannot force SWFs to liqui-
date their holdings;101 however, this very feature also creates the risk of 
                                                                                                             
al savings limits the supply of capital, and simple logic tells us that cost increases when 
demand increases against a limited supply. Id. 
  Now suppose we move to an open capital market system. In such a system, GDP 
= C + I + G + NE, and thus, investment = national savings + net foreign investment. Id. at 
24–26, 117–18. This means that if this type of economy has more investment opportuni-
ties than national savings, foreign investment can be used to supplement the deficit. Id. at 
121–24. Alternatively, if there is more savings than good investment opportunities, inves-
tors can invest in foreign markets. Id. This leads to a more efficient allocation of capital 
because in this case, excess capital can be directed to more profitable ventures. This also 
benefits businesses that have great ideas, but would have been foreclosed from pursuing 
them because the cost of capital is too high. 
 95. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 124; Gen. Atl.: Global Growth Investors, Thought Lea-
dership: Accessing Global Capital Markets: Benefits and Challenges, Mar. 8, 2007, 
http://www.generalatlantic.com/en/news/article/53 (General Atlantic is a global private 
equity fund.). 
 96. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 124. 
 97. See generally René M. Stulz, Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of 
Capital, (Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 99-1, 1999) (providing a more detailed discus-
sion of the effects of globalization of capital markets on cost of capital and effects of 
risk). 
 98. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 126. 
 99. See generally Truman Testimony, supra note 4, at 3. 
 100. Kimmitt, supra note 2, at 122; Lowery, supra note 14. 
 101. Kimmitt, supra note 2, at 122; Lowery, supra note 14. 
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low accountability.102 SWFs typically have no clearly defined liabilities 
like pension funds or other institutional investors; instead, they tend to 
have broadly defined goals and are rarely earmarked for specific gov-
ernment expenditures.103 With essentially no liabilities,104 there is a dan-
ger that fund managers may take excessive risks and treat losses as irre-
levant so long as there is no strong domestic accountability. 
Unfortunately, there is usually little, if any, regulation governing SWF 
behavior either directly or indirectly.105 Therefore, investor discipline 
will depend on citizen monitoring because there is no market discipline 
through institutional investors.106 The problem with this reliance is that 
there is no incentive for individual citizens to monitor the performance of 
the SWF. There is also a free-rider problem with citizen monitoring. 
Even one of the smaller SWFs has a value of $400 million, assuming the 
information is available, any monitoring of the fund will require signifi-
cant time, effort, and expense. Furthermore, a party that monitors the 
SWF will not be able to capture all of the benefits because other parties 
will benefit from the monitoring without incurring the expense. 107 There-
fore, parties will have no incentive to do anything more than the average 
citizen, which, in this case, will be nothing. 
Due to the fact that “SWFs represent large, concentrated, and often 
opaque positions in financial markets,” if the funds have distorted risk 
preferences, it will have the potential of influencing the market.108 This is 
because investment prices may be artificially inflated and misrepresent 
the true relative market value.109 There is also a danger that parties will 
not practice market discipline in assessing the risk of a particular transac-
tion, but instead rely on the notion of “sovereign guarantee.”110 With the 
                                                                                                             
 102. See Lowery, supra note 14. 
 103. Adrian Blundell-Wignall et. al., Sovereign Wealth and Pension Fund Issues, 94 
FIN. MARKET TRENDS 117, 124 (2008). 
 104. This, of course, does not include SWFs that also serve as a pension fund such as 
Norway’s SWF. 
 105. Lowery, supra note 14. 
 106. Id. Accountability of SWFs will depend on “what their citizens know and how 
active they are in monitoring fund activities.” Id. 
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 108. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122–23. 
 109. It is conceivable that if a large SWF fails to assess risk properly, it can influence 
the market price for that asset by purchasing more of the asset than is prudent. This price, 
which is driven up, will not reflect the value of the asset relative to other alternative in-
vestments. 
 110. Lowery, supra note 14. 
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threat of parties not practicing market discipline, a substantial risk to 
market stability arises if SWFs are not regulated because there is typical-
ly limited disclosure of their investment policies, and the private sector 
may react to speculation and rumors of potential SWF shifts.111 There-
fore, SWFs and the capital market would benefit from regulations that 
impose greater transparency, improve the governing and monitoring 
structure, and further accountability of the funds. 
D. National Security 
One of the most critical concerns regarding foreign acquisitions is na-
tional security. When dealing with foreign investment, countries need to 
be able to “ensure that national security concerns are addressed, without 
unnecessarily limiting the benefits of an open economy.”112 
The problem with national security issues is that there is no way to clear-
ly define what types of investment invoke these concerns and what types 
of investments do not.113 While it may be clear that foreign investment in 
a country’s defense industries would raise national security concerns, 
there are many other industries that do not fall within the traditional no-
tion of defense but are nonetheless essential to a country’s security.114 
Furthermore, something short of acquisition of de jure control, such as 
when “an investor seeks board seats or outsized voting rights,” could still 
trigger national security concerns.115 Accordingly, anything but purely 
passive investment by SWFs has the potential of raising these issues.116 
Moreover, as much as FDI may trigger national security concerns, there 
is also a risk that recipient countries will use national security as a guise 
for protectionism policies.117 This risk creates a twin tension that any 
governing policy and principle must balance with care. 
                                                                                                             
 111. Kimmitt, supra note 3, at 122–23. 
 112. Id. at 123. 
 113. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 17. 
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E. Strategic Positioning 
There is also a fear that SWFs will invest for strategic positioning pur-
poses.118 These purposes may motivate the funds to make investments 
with the objective of acquiring intellectual property, skills, and other ad-
vantages, and transferring these assets to domestic companies.119 
On a macro level, strategic acquisitions may not seem like a problem 
because the party that values those assets the most is making use of them; 
however, on a micro level, this creates a conflict of interest problem  
between the SWFs and other investors. Objectives other than maximiza-
tion of share values conflict with the interest other investors because 
transferring technology or other expertise from a portfolio company to a 
domestic company will reduce the value of the portfolio company. 120 All 
owners share in this reduction in value, while only the SWF and its gov-
ernment will benefit from the transfer.121 Thus, the fund is essentially 
stealing from the portfolio company when it induces these kinds of trans-
fers. 
Not only is strategic acquisition fundamentally unfair to the company 
and other investors it will also have detrimental effects on the market.122 
If investors come to believe that they are at a disadvantage in relation to 
the publicly backed entity, it could damage the stability and confidence 
in the market.123 After all, who would want to play when the other party 
always has an Ace up its sleeve? Therefore, any regulation of SWFs 
must address the problem of strategic acquisitions. 
                                                                                                             
 118. See Greene & Yeager, supra note 5, at 259; Lyons, supra note 2, at 15. 
 119. See Lyons, supra note 5, at 15. See also Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 1, at 
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 122. See Greene & Yeager, supra note 2, at 259. 
 123. See id. 
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F. The Real Problem: Asymmetric Information 
At the root of these concerns is the problem of asymmetric informa-
tion. The outcries for more transparency on the part of SWFs arise out of 
insufficient or unreliable information. The asymmetric problem can be 
due to the inability to ascertain the accuracy of information, the lack of 
incentives to acquire information, or the inability to acquire the informa-
tion. While they cannot be attributed to insufficient information per se, 
the problems associated with nationalism or protectionism are still based 
on the fear and misunderstanding of SWFs.124 So, too, is the problem of 
market distortion, which occurs when other parties cannot understand an 
SWF’s market behavior and objectives because of insufficient informa-
tion. Finally, lessening the informational disadvantage of recipient coun-
tries can mitigate the dangers of strategic positioning and national security 
problems. This is because the recipient country will be able to make de-
cisions on how to respond to foreign acquisitions with accurate informa-
tion rather than on mere speculation. Also, by strengthening the informa-
tional position, host countries have an incentive to limit, if not eliminate, 
strategic motives from their investments since they do not want their op-
portunities limited by restrictive pressures.125 Thus, creating a method of 
disclosures that is credible and reliable can decrease most of these con-
cerns. 
III. SWFS SHOULD BE REGULATED IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM 
International regulation and monitoring of SWFs is preferable to do-
mestic regulations and monitoring. In particular, such a forum is attrac-
tive because of its ability to alleviate many of the concerns discussed 
above. Furthermore, while it is true that even without an international 
regime a country can still impose disclosure requirements and other 
forms of protections on SWFs, international regulation provides several 
additional benefits. Beyond the ability to address the concerns surround-
ing SWFs, an international forum would protect the host and recipient 
countries’ interests, create a level playing field and avoid over-regulation 
due to nationalist and protectionist pressures. 
First, drafting and implementing regulations internationally protects 
both the host countries’ and recipient countries’ interests. It would do 
this by creating an opportunity for these countries to have a meaningful 
dialog over how SWFs should be regulated. If left solely to domestic 
regulations, there is a risk that only recipient countries’ concerns will be 
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 125. While there are a lot of opportunities available to SWFs, all else equal, I believe 
any investor will prefer having more opportunities than less. 
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addressed, as SWFs and their host countries will not have an opportunity 
to voice their concerns. The ability to express different opinions is essen-
tial because SWFs and recipient countries have competing interests. On 
the one hand, SWFs want to have unlimited freedom to invest however 
they want. On the other hand, recipient countries may want to limit what 
SWFs can invest in. Recipient countries have an incentive to enact, and 
do enact, legislation and policies that restrict SWFs’ activities to protect 
domestic industries from foreign acquisitions.126 Such unilateral devel-
opment of regulation has the potential of placing SWFs in an unduly dis-
advantageous position, and even if SWFs are not disadvantaged by the 
legislation, a perception that SWFs are being discriminated against may 
still result and harm the capital market. 
Second, international regulation could create a level playing field and 
prevent a race to the bottom. Preventing harmful investments and en-
couraging beneficial ones should be a major goal of regulating SWFs. 
Domestic regulations, however, cannot adequately serve this mission 
because recipient countries have two opposing interests in regards to 
SWFs. On the one hand, they would like to prevent harmful investments 
and even prevent foreign acquisition of domestic interests by imposing 
regulations. On the other hand, they want to attract foreign investment to 
fund other investments by lowering the barriers to investment.127 This 
could lead to under regulation of SWFs by recipient countries, which 
creates its own problems. 
There is also a genuine risk that underregulation will occur because 
countries are in constant competition for investment and capital. Since 
the credit crisis began in 2007, the competition for foreign capital has 
                                                                                                             
 126. Motivated by the interest in “defending French companies from unwanted preda-
tors,” France has proposed to create its own SWF and encouraged other EU countries to 
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become even greater.128 Some countries have not only been open to SWF 
investments but also actively sought them.129 They accomplish this by 
lowering transaction costs or giving preferred treatment to certain inves-
tors, which can be done by offering preferential tax treatments, such as 
deferred taxes or lower tax rates,130 or by having favorable regulations. In 
an environment where countries are in desperate need of capital, coun-
tries may decide that the benefit of more capital outweighs the cost of 
bad investments and lower their regulations to attract more investments. 
Market forces will then force other countries to lower their regulations or 
miss out on the benefits of investments by SWFs.131 Eventually, if the 
need for competition is strong enough, market forces will cause countries 
to reduce their regulation to the minimum level and, perhaps, to no regu-
lation at all. 
Because of the macroeconomic impact that SWFs can have on the 
global economy, it is undesirable for countries to decide that capital is 
more important than a safe and stable investing environment. Not only 
will competition for capital create incentive problems on the regulation 
of SWFs; it will also create global and regional systemic problems.132 
Any regional market has a certain level of liquidity and shock absorbent 
abilities.133 Because SWFs control a significant block of wealth, any sud-
den movement by them will have significant impacts on the local mar-
kets.134 Take Romania, for example, one of the newest members of the 
European Union. Its annual nominal GDP in 2007 was $166 billion, and 
                                                                                                             
 128. See, e.g., Andrew Hay & Manuel Maria, Spain Wants Sovereign Wealth Funds to 
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it had approximately $46 billion in investments that year.135 Compared to 
the United States, which has $13.84 trillion in GDP with $2.1 trillion in 
investments, Romania’s market is relatively small, and an influx of capi-
tal or sudden decrease in capital availability will have significantly great-
er effects on its economy.136 Furthermore, there is a chance that any capi-
tal market regardless of size could experience a total collapse given a 
sufficiently large market shock. In addition to the risk of market shock 
and stability, the risk of sudden movement by SWFs will cause a rise in 
interest rates, because an interest rate is an aggregate of the real interest 
rate, inflation expectation, risk premium, and liquidity preference.137 An 
increase in risk will require borrowers to offer additional risk premiums 
to compensate the investors.138 Therefore, ceteris paribus, an increase in 
risk will cause an increase in interest rates.139 
Above all else, a level playing field will ensure that investments and 
allocation of capital will be made on the basis of risk and reward, rather 
than on the cost of compliance with regulatory requirements. If we ac-
cept that the principle goal of international finance is to place capital in 
the hands of those who can use it best, a system that allocates resources 
based on compliance cost is untenable. In such a system, compliance cost 
operates as a tax on SWFs. While it is not entirely clear who will ulti-
mately bear the cost of the tax, companies that depend on SWF invest-
ments are the most likely candidates. This is because no one market do-
minates the international capital market to such a degree that there are no 
alternative venues for SWFs to invest.140 
A uniform, or even a mostly uniform, regulatory system will have the 
additional benefit of lower compliance cost and redundancy.141 The 
banking privacy regulation in the United States demonstrates these bene-
fits in a domestic context. In the United States, banks are subject to a 
situation similar to what SWFs experience. They are subject to regula-
                                                                                                             
 135. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 34. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Mankiw, supra note 94, at 57, 89–95, 271–73. 
 138. See id. at 57. 
 139. See id. 
 140. With $164 trillion in global financial assets, it will not be difficult for SWFs to 
find opportunities all over the world to invest their 1.8% worth of global financial assets. 
See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 49, at 10–11 (indicating the amount of global 
financial assets). Even if SWFs are foreclosed from investing in U.S. denominated assets, 
there still remains almost $100 trillion worth of other financial assets in which SWFs can 
invest. See id. 
 141. Elizabeth K. Brill, Privacy and Financial Institutions: Current Developments 
Concerning the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 21 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 167, 216–
17 (2002). 
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tions by multiple jurisdictions and benefit from a uniform system. With 
varying privacy regulations among states, and between state and federal 
requirements, large financial services organizations will likely face over-
lapping and conflicting privacy regulations.142 Financial services will 
also “be vulnerable to more stringent, and inevitably conflicting, state 
regulation.”143 Uniform regulation is necessary for maximum efficiency 
and equity144: “[c]ompanies benefit from decreased compliance cost . . . . 
Consumers benefit from a more consistent and comprehensible regulato-
ry system.”145 
Using the same logic, these benefits of uniform regulations also extend 
to SWFs. By adopting uniform international regulations to govern SWF 
behavior, the funds only have to comply with one set of regulatory re-
quirements, rather than comply with requirements of each individual 
country. The recipient countries also benefit because they are able to 
pool the cost of monitoring compliance, rather than having to individual-
ly monitor each and every potential SWF investor. Finally, this approach 
discharges the problem and possibility of conflicting regulations. 
The danger also remains that certain countries will take a protectionist 
position and overregulate SWF investments.146 One of the major goals of 
regulating SWFs is to prevent harmful investments and encourage bene-
ficial ones, and overregulation has the potential of driving away foreign 
investment.147 While international regulations are unlikely to eliminate 
all protectionist problems, they do have the potential to reduce protec-
tionist pressures.148 
                                                                                                             
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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 146. This is particularly evident when we consider the fact that French President Nico-
las Sarkozy “called on European nations to create sovereign wealth funds” to protect 
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FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0b3e3988-dfe6-11dc-8073-000077 
9fd2ac.html. 
 148. See INT’L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, supra note 16, at 4. 
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IV. THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES 
A. What Are the Santiago Principles? 
In October 2007, the International Monetary and Financial Commit-
tee149 expressed the need for “further analysis of key issues for investors 
and recipients of SWF flows, including a dialogue on identifying best 
practices.”150 Based on this need, the International Working Group of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (“IWG”) was founded April 30—May 1, 2008.151 
With Hamad Al Hurr Al Suwaidi152 and Jaime Caruana153 as co-chairs, 
the IWF consists of twenty-six IMF members with SWFs.154 Using re-
sults from an IMF-commissioned voluntary survey on current structures 
and practices, drawing from widely-accepted international principles and 
practices, and taking input from a number of recipient countries, the 
IWG developed a set of Generally Accepted Principles and Practices 
(“GAPP”), also known as the “Santiago Principles.”155 Underlying the 
different principles of the GAPP are four foundational objectives: 
i) To help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of 
capital and investment; 
ii) To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure require-
ments in the countries in which they invest; 
iii) To invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-
related considerations; and 
iv) To have in place a transparent and sound governance structure that 
provides for adequate operational controls, risk management, and ac-
countability.156 
The IWG identified several purposes for the development of the 
GAPP: (1) increase countries’ and the financial markets’ understanding 
of SWFs; (2) ensure that the international financial market continues to 
benefit from SWF participation in the financial market; (3) support the 
“institutional framework, governance, and investment operations of SWFs 
                                                                                                             
 149. The International Monetary and Financial Committee is a committee of the Board 
of Governors of the IMF. Id. at 1. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Hamad Al Hurr Al Suwaidi is the Undersecretary of the Abu Dhabi Finance De-
partment. Id. 
 153. Jaime Caruana is the Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department 
of the IMF. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1 n.2. 
 155. Id. at 1–2. 
 156. Id. at 4. 
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that are guided by their policy purpose and objectives and consistent with 
a sound macroeconomic policy framework”; and (4) “improve understand-
ing of SWFs as economically and financially oriented entities in both the 
home and recipient countries” for the “stability of the global financial 
system, reduc[tion of] protectionist pressures, and . . . maint[enance] of 
an open and stable investment climate.”157 To achieve these goals, the 
IWG is relying on cooperation from recipient countries and the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).158 
Comprised of twenty-four rules, the Santiago Principles are a voluntary 
set of criteria “that the members of the IWG support and either have im-
plemented or aspire to implement.”159 These principles are subject to ap-
plicable laws of the home country and any intergovernmental agree-
ments.160 The IWG expects that the GAPP will guide SWF activities so 
that the funds will invest professionally and help institute-related re-
forms.161 Finally, the IWG assumes that all SWFs will operate on a good 
faith basis and comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure re-
quirements.162 
The Santiago Principles are divided into three groups: “(i) legal 
framework, objectives, and coordination with macroeconomic policies; 
(ii) institutional framework and governance structure; and (iii) invest-
ment and risk management framework.”163 The IWG explains that the 
principles in the first area “underpin a robust institutional framework and 
governance structure of the SWF, and facilitate formulation of appropri-
ate investment strategies consistent with the SWF’s stated policy objec-
tives.”164 The second area ensures that SWF investments are free from 
political influences by separating the owner, the government, and the 
management to create operational independence.165 The third area pro-
motes sound investment operation and accountability as well as demon-
strates operational discipline.166 The IWG expects that different SWFs 
will have different time frames for adopting the GAPP because of the 
evolving nature of SWFs, the different maturity levels of the funds, as 
well as their different investment objectives, horizons, and strategies.167 
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Finally, the IWG considers the GAPP to be a minimum standard for 
SWFs, but recognizes that not all principles will be applicable to every 
SWF.168 
B. Criticisms of the Santiago Principles 
The Santiago Principles offer important guidelines for the structure, 
governance, and management of SWFs; however, they have several 
flaws that will constrain their effectiveness in achieving their stated ob-
jectives. First, the GAPP is too focused on SWFs as entities and not 
enough on their relationship with recipient countries. Second, there are 
no standards to measure compliance with or achievement of the Prin-
ciples. Third, the Santiago Principles do not address the asymmetric in-
formation problems faced by recipient countries. Finally, there are no 
sanctions or rewards available to ensure compliance. 
Rather than balancing the interests and concerns of both host and reci-
pient countries, the Santiago Principles focus exclusively on what SWFs 
and the host countries should do. While principles concerning the proper 
structuring, governance, and management of SWFs are important, the 
relationship among the funds, the host countries, and the recipient coun-
tries is far more important. As demonstrated above, the problems sur-
rounding SWFs or foreign investments in general are not one-sided. In-
stead, it is the tension among the competing interests of parties that is the 
source of the problems and deserves the attention of the international 
community. 
For instance, it is not necessary for SWFs to disclose every piece of fi-
nancial data or every strategy; however, it would be insufficient for the 
funds to merely release a statement containing only publicly available 
information. Excessive disclosure requirements are also problematic, 
because they would inhibit the SWFs’ daily management and goal of 
maximizing returns, since every strategy decision would be public in-
formation. Additionally, disclosures for the sake of formality alone 
would not create a more stable global capital market since they do not 
actually ease the informational barrier. Simply repackaging publicly 
available information is convenient for other parties, but it does not im-
prove their informational position in the least. 
A similar situation exists for asset allocation. SWFs should not be re-
quired to provide the world with a detailed list of which companies they 
have invested in and the size of their investment. This would simply im-
pose an unnecessary cost because whether or not an SWF invested in a 
paper towel company does not matter to recipient countries or the finan-
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cial market. However, a system could be created that requires disclosures 
when an SWF invests in a particular list of companies or industries. This 
kind of scheme would put SWFs on notice that recipient countries are 
concerned about these companies and industries for either strategic or 
national security purposes, and would also limit potential protectionist 
regulations. As the above two examples illustrate, the international 
community needs to focus not on SWFs and recipient countries separate-
ly, but as one problem. By dealing solely with the SWFs’ side of the 
problem, the Santiago Principles are essentially putting a Band-Aid over 
a gaping wound. 
The GAPP lacks measurable standards that an SWF, host country, re-
cipient country, counterparty, or third-party can use to determine to what 
extent and how effectively a particular SWF has achieved these mini-
mum principles. It is important to remember that these Principles should 
not be adopted simply for the sake of having basic principles. Instead, 
constructive feedback is essential for the continued development of  
international norms governing SWFs in this ever-changing financial 
market landscape.169 Constructive feedback requires that there is some 
method of measuring success. How can one know whether SWFs and 
recipient countries can work together to increase the stability of the fi-
nancial market, avoid protectionism, etc., without knowing whether the 
measures implemented thus far are effective or even serving the purposes 
that they are suppose to serve? By not creating a standard to measure 
whether the Santiago Principles are a success, the IWG deprived the 
GAPP of an essential tool to improve the Principles’ effectiveness and 
make them a success. 
Furthermore, the Santiago Principles do not address the asymmetric in-
formation problems faced by recipient countries. The GAPP in a number 
of sections and subsections calls for various public disclosures.170 This 
movement towards transparency is an important step in dealing with the 
asymmetric information problem, because the adoption of these Prin-
ciples demonstrates that SWFs and the IWG recognize the importance of 
transparency. However, the asymmetric information problem does not lie 
solely with the lack of information, but with the lack of credible informa-
tion. By failing to create a method to ascertain this, the effectiveness of 
any disclosure will be limited.171 This cripples the Santiago Principles in 
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the area where they are most needed. When countries trust each other 
and have a good relationship, they do not need to rely on the Principles 
because they have no reason to suspect foul play. National security and 
strategic acquisition concerns are not a concern.172 In contrast, when 
countries do not trust each other, disclosures that comply with the GAPP 
would not ease the concerns of recipient countries because they will con-
sider the disclosures unreliable. If the Santiago Principles are only effec-
tive when they are not needed and are ineffective when they are actually 
needed, what possible benefit will they provide besides recognizing that 
there is a problem? 
Finally, because the GAPP is a voluntary set of principles subject to 
the laws of host countries, there are no rewards or sanctions available to 
encourage or force compliance. Given the recognized importance of 
sound regulation of SWFs, ideally there should be a mechanism that will 
ensure that parties comply with the Principles and will encourage the 
adoption of the GAPP. It is foreseeable that counterparties could require 
the adoption of the GAPP through contract; however, the adoption of the 
GAPP by SWFs, limited as it is, should not be left to private dealings. 
Instead, it should be required as a systemic control for the stability of the 
world’s financial market.173 
C. How to Improve the Santiago Principles 
Given the limitations of the Santiago Principles, there are several de-
vices that could improve their operation and effectiveness. Crippled by 
the failure to address the relational element between SWFs and other 
market participants, the lack of standards, and the asymmetric informa-
tion problem, I propose four changes to the structure and elements that I 
believe will improve the Santiago Principles’ chance of success. 
First, the IWG and OECD should collaborate and create an expanded 
list of guiding principles to address not only what SWFs should do as 
best practices, but also the relationship and competing interests of par-
ties. A collaborative approach would allow both sides to voice various 
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concerns, and identify a balanced approach to deal with the problems 
surrounding SWFs. As discussed above, it would be ideal if the IWG and 
OECD developed a single system of regulation.174 Furthermore, the col-
laboration between the two needs to deal with SWFs’ relationships with 
third-parties because recipient countries are not the only interested par-
ticipants. Unlike the current Santiago Principles, this method would ad-
dress a fuller spectrum of concerns that are raised in the international 
capital market.175 
Second, this collaborative group should create more specific guidelines 
for disclosure requirements and create standard disclosures. The devel-
opment of specific disclosure requirements would benefit the market by 
creating a more level playing field176 and address the information imbal-
ance among the parties. Standard disclosures reduce the informational 
imbalance by creating reasonable expectations of what will be disclosed 
and establishing a minimum standard of transparency. This method would 
protect SWFs from having unreasonable disclosure requirements imposed 
on them177 and would also ensure that recipient countries have the infor-
mation necessary to protect their national security and other domesticin-
terests.178 Standardized disclosure requirements, by avoiding duplication, 
would also benefit SWFs by lowering costs associated with their produc-
tion. 
Third, the GAPP should create a standard that permits the IWG and its 
corollary to measure how successful the Santiago Principles are in ac-
complishing their objectives. It would aid them in developing a plan for 
improving the effectiveness of the Principles. More importantly, such 
standards would enable the parties to monitor the actions of both SWFs 
and recipient countries, which would help ensure fair play and minimize 
systematic risk. 
Finally, an independent audit committee should be created. This com-
mittee should be composed of individuals appointed from an equal number 
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of members from SWFs and recipient countries, and one member nomi-
nated by the IMF. It should be granted access to all relevant materials to 
ensure compliance with the GAPP and the validity of disclosures, and be 
required to publish its findings. By using an independent committee to 
verify information, parties could be assured that the information dis-
closed by the SWFs is indeed credible. Furthermore, this approach would 
recognize the risk of unlimited access to confidential information. In ex-
change for unlimited access to the SWFs’ information, the committee 
should be required to sign nondisclosure agreements that would limit the 
use of the information for the sole purpose of verifying the disclosures. 
By addressing both what should be disclosed and the creditability issue, 
the GAPP could significantly reduce the asymmetric information prob-
lem. 
CONCLUSION 
While there are severe limitations to the Santiago Principles, they still 
remain an important first step in the creation of a new international norm. 
The GAPP outlined the various concerns relating to SWFs and created a 
forum for addressing how SWFs should behave and how other parties 
should treat them. However, despite these advances, the Santiago Prin-
ciples will eventually need to address the asymmetric information problem 
as well as the relational element between SWFs and recipient countries 
in order to more fully address the concerns connected to state capitalism 
and the use of SWFs. The development of standardized disclosures, 
benchmarks of success, and an independent audit committee would be a 
beneficial step for the future of regulating and monitoring SWFs’ activi-
ties and their evolution as financial instruments. 
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